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EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL & CODES OF
ETHICS: THE PROFESSIONAL'S DILEMMA
SEYMOUR MOSKOWITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries a new set of legal rules
emerged in the United States governing the relationship between employer
and employee. These rules were called "employment-at-will" and provided
that, absent express agreement to the contrary, employment was for an in-
definite time and could be terminated by either party, for any reason, or for
no reason at all. This doctrine is a unique product of American common
law, created by state and federal judges, and continues, substantially un-
changed, until today. Because of the economic power of employers, espe-
cially large corporations, the rule gives management largely unfettered con-
trol over the workplace in most situations. I believe the development of the
employment-at-will doctrine cannot be explained on the bases of precedent,
legal history, or legal analysis. Rather, it emerged because of its congruence
with the dominant business-oriented political ideology of a century ago, and
was elevated to constitutional doctrine by the Supreme Court in the early
twentieth century.
The employment-at-will rule, of course, applied only in the absence of
an express contract or some contrary public law pronouncement. Since the
1930s, a number of these exceptions have been created limiting the em-
ployer's power to discharge. Most significant is the requirement that an em-
ployer show "just cause" for firing unionized workers covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. As of 1985, eighteen percent of American
employees were covered by this exception.' In addition, approximately sev-
enteen percent of the workforce are public employees,2 protected against
arbitrary dismissal by civil service rules and constitutional protections. A
third major exception to the at-will rule involves statutes which limit em-
ployer discharge power where the action is based on the worker's member-
* B.A. Columbia University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Valparaiso
University School of Law. Parts of this paper were originally delivered at my Inaugural Lec-
ture at the Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce Statistical Abstract of the United
States 409 (1987).
2. ROTHSTEIN, KNAPP & LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 204 (1987).
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ship in a protected class, such as race, sex, and handicap,3 or is based on
whistle-blowing to public authorities.4 Despite these exceptions, employees
subject to the at-will doctrine still number more than half the American
workforce.5
The American common law rules regarding employment functionally
give the employer control of the terms and tenure of employment in the
vast majority of work situations. Most employees are tied geographically to
one locale, have invested time and knowledge in their particular jobs, and
do not have the financial resources to readily change positions. While many
employers do not abuse that economic control, numerous reported cases re-
flect the potential for overreaching which is inherent under existing law.6
Professional employees, such as lawyers, engineers, doctors, and nurses, who
work full time for one employer, are particularly vulnerable. While man-
agement demands obedience and loyalty, the professional's work is im-
pressed with a public trust. He must ensure that the power inherent in his
work is intelligently and ethically exercised. Professional codes of ethics ex-
press the clear command that duty to clients, patients, and society as a
whole is paramount to the duty owed the employer.
I believe the law should provide protection for professionals caught in
this dilemma by creating a shield against reprisals for those willing to abide
by the dictates of their professional conscience. A fundamental premise of
modern labor law is that society cannot allow the employer's economic
power to dominate individual workers when that power produces socially
undesirable results. This article will present an argument for shielding pro-
fessionals trapped between their code of ethics and their employer's de-
mands. Part II reviews the history and background of the employment-at-
will rule. Part III sketches statutory and contractual inroads on this doc-
trine, while Part IV examines recent judicially-crafted exceptions. Part V
argues that codes of ethics should be treated as a public policy exception to
the traditional American rule, based on the nature of the professional's
work and society's deep interest in ethical behavior. Part VI presents a
model for resolving the inevitable disputes which will emerge between pro-
fessional workers and their employers, and advocates the creation of alter-
nate dispute resolution mechanisms which could obviate costly and lengthy
litigation.
3. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
5. Approximately 60 million employees in the private sector are subject to the employ-
ment-at-will rule. See ROTHSTEIN, KNAPP & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 738-39.
6. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The employment-at-will rule is traditionally traced to an 1877 treatise
on master-servant law, written by New York attorney H.B. Wood. Wood's
treatise stated the rule in absolutely certain terms:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it
a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.
A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring and no presumption attaches
that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
whatever time the party may serve.'
Although Wood used this proposition as an evidentiary presumption, 8 state
courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries turned it into a
substantive rule of law for employment relations.9 Those courts held that in
the absence of a written contract (then, as now, rare in most work settings),
an employer could discharge an employee at any time for "good cause, for
no cause, or even for cause morally wrong." 10 The quick and universal ac-
ceptance of Wood's Rule gave employers absolute control over their em-
ployees. The rule transformed an English and early American employment
relationship that was based on concepts of status into contract doctrine with
benefits concentrated on one side.
Modern courts, lawyers, and legislators tend to view the employment-
at-will rule as long standing and of unquestioned validity. But Wood's Rule
was not supported by precedent, legal history, or legal analysis. The very
cases cited by Wood in his treatise did not support his rule." American
7. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1977) [hereinafter denoted in the text as Wood's Rule].
8. "[I]f the servant seeks to make out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof." Id.
9. See, e.g., Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 720, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (1910);
Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895); Henry v. Pittsburg &
Lake Erie R.R., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157 (1891).
10. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 530, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915).
11. The cases cited by Wood are Wilder v. United States (Wilder's Case), 5 Ct. Cl.
462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); DeBriar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450
(1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris,
24 Mich. 115 (1871). None of these cases directly support Wood's rule. Tatterson and Frank-
lin are contrary, DeBriar was a real property eviction case, and Wilder involved a commercial
contract to transport goods for the U.S. Army. Each was decided on unique facts and proce-
dural issues, and not one stands squarely for the proposition that an indefinite hiring is termi-
nable at will. These case are analyzed in detail in Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 n.54 (1974). [hereinafter referred to as Implied Contract
Rights].
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courts in the nineteenth century often utilized the presumption that unless a
contrary intent was found, the employment relationship was for a defined
period, usually one year, or for the period of the wage payment.12 As late as
1891, the New York Court of Appeals, in the very state where Wood wrote,
held that employment for an unstated term was presumptively for the term
of the periodic wage payment. "In this country, at least, if a contract for
hiring is at so much per month, it will readily be presumed that the hiring
was by the month, even if nothing was said about the term of service."' s
Legal history also gives little or no support for the at-will rule. At the
time Wood wrote his treatise, English law basically viewed employment as
a master-servant relationship binding the parties to a continuing contract.
Blackstone's Commentaries noted the rule to be "[i]f the hiring be general,
without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a
year. 114 This rule evolved from the 1562 English Statute of Laborers which
required certain persons to accept work, but also required notice for termi-
nation and provided that apprentices could be discharged only for "reasona-
ble cause."' 5 Master-servant law was based on status relationships which
both restricted and protected the servant.' 6 The early English doctrine obvi-
ously reflected an agricultural economy in which there was a mutual need
of landowners for a guaranteed source of labor during planting and harvest-
ing, and of employees' for support during unproductive seasons. The legal
rules rested on the underlying duty to work, on prohibitions against leaving
employment before the end of a term,' 7 and on the English Poor Laws,
which used residency and employment to determine which geographical
community was responsible for the support of indigents.' 8 The early English
common law thus embodied a presumption of yearly hiring,'9 and required
a showing of just cause for discharge prior to the end of that year.20 The
presumption could be rebutted by facts showing contrary in-
12. See, e.g., Margarahan v. Wright, 83 Ga. 773, 777-78, 10 S.E. 584, 585 (1889);
State v. Fisher Varnish Co., 43 N.J.L. 151, 153 (1881); Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124,
26 N.E. 143 (1891); Tucker v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 6 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (Sup.
Ct. 1889); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882). Contra, e.g., Haney v. Caldwell, 35
Ark. 156, 168-69 (1879); Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541, 548-49 (1877); Finger v. Koch &
Schilling Brewing Co., 13 Mo. App. 310, 310-11 (1883).
13. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 129, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (1891).
14. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (1878).
15. Id. at 426.
16. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY & THE NEW PROPERTY 143-50 (1981).
17. See generally Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-20 (1976).
18. Id.
19. 1 LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 156 (2d ed.
1913).
20. See Implied Contract Rights, supra note 11, at 340; Annotation, Modern Status as
to Duration of Employment Where Contract Specifies No Term But Fixes Daily or Longer
Compensation, 93 A.L.R. 3d 659, 662 (1979).
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tent-specifically, custom of the trade and frequency of the periodic
payments.2
The theoretical basis for Wood's Rule, founded in contract ideas of
mutuality of obligation and equality of bargaining position, was as insub-
stantial as its precedent and its history. Wood's reasoning was that dis-
charged workers had no legal protection because any presumed or continu-
ing employment contract lacked mutuality. Employees could quit when they
wished; therefore, employers could discharge whenever and for whatever
reason they wished.22 This position misconceives the mutuality requirement.
Consideration is the crucial element in contract law, not mutual obliga-
tions.23 Mutuality, in the form of identical mirrored promises, has never
been required in order to make agreements binding.
Mutuality does, however, preclude judicial enforcement of gratuitous
or donative promises in which one party exacts a benefit from another with-
out providing anything in return. The American employment law cases
might have viewed the relationship as a continuing one, requiring objective
cause to terminate, as easily as an at-will relationship. An employer can
promise both compensation for work rendered and "just cause" before dis-
missal, while receiving services from the employee in exchange for both
promises. That would be an enforceable contract.24
21. See Feinman, supra note 17, at 120-21. What constituted reasonable notice was
decided on individual fact bases; the custom of the trade was often determinative. Id. at 121,
nn.20-26.
22. See, e.g., Gollberg v. Bramson Pub. Co., 685 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1982) (since
plaintiff-employee could not be forced to work for defendant-employer, the employer could not
be forced to keep the plaintiff-employee working).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1979). See generally IA A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 at 12 (1963 and C. Kaufman Supp. 1982). Corbin
notes that the key question is whether an employee has provided consideration by performance.
In a number of cases, it has been said that if one of the parties reserves a power to
terminate the contract, it will be interpreted as giving a similar power to the other party.
It may be that this interpretation is justified in some particular cases; but such an impli-
cation is not a necessary one and is not required by any general rule or doctrine of the
law. It is quite erroneous to suppose that there is any rule of "mutuality" that requires
such an implication.
Id. § 167, at 93.
24. See, e.g., Eales v. Tanana Valley Med. Surg. Grp., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983);
Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26 (1981); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc., 99 N.J Super. 248, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modified, 101 N.J. Super. 496, 499 A.2d 515
(1985).
In most of the cases involving an employer's personnel policy manual, the document is
prepared without any negotiations and is voluntarily distributed to the workforce by the
employer. It seeks no return promise from the employees. It is reasonable to interpret it
as seeking continued work from the employees, who, in most cases, are free to quit since
they are almost always employees at will, not simply in the sense that the employer can
fire them without cause, but in the sense that they can quit without breaching any obliga-
tion. Thus analyzed, the manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral con-
1988]
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The American courts' adoption and application of the employment-at-
will rule made it impossible for the employee, by accepting employment and
working, to bind the employer to continue that relationship so long as the
employee's work was needed and his performance was satisfactory. Even in
litigated cases in which the worker was able to show a definite term, he was
often denied relief on the ground that the worker had not given additional
consideration to justify restrictions on the employer's absolute power to dis-
charge.25 Satisfactory work performance by the employee was held not to
be sufficient consideration.28 Moreover, even on its own terms, the mutual-
ity rationale is ordinarily utilized only in bilateral contract situations. The
typical employment relationship, however, is more logically viewed as a uni-
lateral contract-an offer, followed by performance in reliance on the offer
which constitutes acceptance. The employer's promise becomes irrevocable
after the worker has labored, despite the employee's ability to depart at any
time.'
In a series of early twentieth century cases, the Supreme Court raised
these dubious contract notions to constitutional status. In 1908, the Su-
preme Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute which made dis-
charge of railroad employees, solely because of union membership,
tract-the employees' bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being their
continued work when they have no obligation to continue.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Plason v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America, 283 Mich. 561, 568,
278 N.W. 687, 689 (1938).
26. See generally Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individ-
ual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082,
1099 (1984).
27. A promise by an employer to pay a bonus or a pension to an employee in case
the latter continues to serve for a stated period is not enforceable when made; but the
employee can accept the offer by continuing to serve as requested even though he makes
no promise. There is no mutuality of obligation; but there is sufficient consideration in
the form of service rendered. Indeed, the employer's offered promise becomes irrevocable
by him as soon as the employee has rendered any substantial service in the process of
accepting; and this is true in spite of the fact that the employee may be privileged to quit
the service at any time.
IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 153, at 18-20 (1963) (emphasis added and footnotes
omitted). See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 2-14, 2-18, 2-24 (2d
ed. 1970). See also Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 141,
143 A.2d 762, 764 (1958).
The fallacy in the [defendant's] argument is the assumption therein that the company's
offer was susceptible of acceptance only by the rendition of a promise or undertaking by
the employee in exchange, i.e., that it contemplated the consummation of bilateral con-
tract. Its natural construction, however, is the submission of an offer in return for rendi-
tion of services in employment by the employee until the occurrence of the condition
stipulated a unilateral contract. This is the general present-day construction of employ-
ment stipulations for severance pay, bonuses or similar incentive plans.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 7
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unlawful.
The right of the employee to quit the service of the employer,
for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for
whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee.
It was the legal right of the defendant Adair . . .to discharge
Coppage because of his being a member of a labor organization,
as it was the legal right of Coppage, if he saw fit to do so . . . to
quit the service in which he has engaged, because the defendant
employed some members who were not members of a labor or-
ganization. In all such particulars the employer and the em-
ployee have equality of right . ... .
The Court reasoned that "freedom of contract," then in constitutional fash-
ion, allowed an employer to dispense with the services of an employee for
"union membership," as well as for "reason . . .whim, caprice, prejudice,
or malice." 29 Any public interference with this liberty of contract was a
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 30
State courts were contemporaneously striking down statutes prohibit-
ing "yellow dog" (anti-union) contracts with the same logic. Unrestricted
freedom of contract became constitutional dogma, affirming the claimed
liberty of both employer and employee to terminate the work relationship
by dismissal or resignation.3' As one typical decision noted in striking down
the Wisconsin statute forbidding discharge for union membership:
As each morning comes, the employee is free to decide not to
work, the employer to decide not to receive him, but for this
28. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908).
29. Id. at 173.
30. Accord, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down similar state legisla-
tion). Roscoe Pound condemned Adair as "mechanical jurisprudence," that failed to consider
social changes in determining legal doctrine. In a 1909 Yale Law Journal article Pound at-
tacked Adair as a decision which "exaggerates the importance of property and of contract,
exaggerates private right at the expense of public right, and is hostile to legislation, taking a
minimum of lawmaking to be the ideal." Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457
(1909).
Legislation designed to give laborers some measure of practical independence, which, if
allowed to operate, would put them in a position of reasonable equality with their mas-
ters, is said by courts, because it infringes on a theoretical equality, to be insulting to
their manhood and degrading, to put them under guardianship, to create a class of statu-
tory laborers, and to stamp them as imbeciles.
Id. at 463.
31. See, e.g., Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 F. 500 (C.C.
Nev. 1908); People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1924); Coffeyville
Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 P. 848 (1904); People v. Marcus, 185
N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 1073 (1906); Jackson v. Berger, 92 Ohio St. 130, 110 N.E. 732 (1915);
Bemis v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. 114, 152 P. 456 (1915); Commonwealth v. Clark, 14 Pa.
Super. 435 (1900); State ex rel Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N.W. 1098 (1902).
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statute. That the act in question invades the liberty of the em-
ployer in an extreme degree, and in a respect entitled to be held
sacred, except for the most cogent and countervailing considera-
tions, we have pointed out. Hardly any of the personal civil
rights is higher than that of free will in forming and continuing
the relation of master and servant.32
But freedom of contract in the employment realm was, in reality, as
Justice Jackson has written, "the freedom of the sweatshop." 3 Equality of
bargaining power between worker and management was a sham. The lack
of power of workers was extensively aired before Congress in hearings on
the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. As Senator Wagner noted,
[T]he fathers of our Nation did not regard freedom of con-
tract as an abstract end. They valued it as a means of insuring
equal opportunities, which cannot be attained where contracts
are dictated by the stronger party. The law has long refused to
recognize contracts secured through physical compulsion or du-
ress. The actualities of present-day life impel us to recognize ec-
onomic duress as well. We are forced to recognize the futility of
pretending that there is equality of freedom when a single work-
man, with only his job between his family and ruin, sits down to
draw a contact of employment with a representative of a tre-
mendous organization having thousands of workers at its call.
Thus the right to bargain collectively, guaranteed to labor by
section 7(a) of the Recovery Act, is a veritable charter of free-
dom of contract; without it there would be slavery by contract.3 4
Congress responded with explicit findings in section 1 of the NLRA.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of con-
tract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other
forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects
the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power
of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization
of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and be-
tween industries. 5
32. State ex rel Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 546, 90 N.W. 1098, 1104
(1902).
33. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 170 (1941).
34. 78 CONG. REc. 3678 (1934) (Speech of Senator Wagner introduced by Senator
Barkley into Congressional Record), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 at 20 (1949).
35. Natl. Lab. Rel. Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) § 1, 29 U.S.C. §
[Vol. 23
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The Supreme Court soon followed a similar rationale. The legal philos-
ophy in the early twentieth century constitutional decisions has been ideo-
logically dead since the 1930s. Adair was effectively overruled in Texas &
N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks,36 which accepted Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power to protect workers' right to organize and to
bargain collectively, free from the employer's discharge threats. By 1941,
the Court noted that its decisions since Adair had sapped that case of its
vitality.3 7 The high court now diligently avoids constitutional scrutiny of
business regulation and has recently reaffirmed that it is "well-established
that a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restric-
tions on private property." 38 It has likewise recently given explicit and long
deserved recognition to a government worker's interest in retaining
employment.39
How then can we account for the uniform judicial acceptance of
Wood's Rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? I believe
the at-will doctrine cannot be viewed apart from the contemporaneous ac-
tivities of courts in allied controversies.40 Judges in that period were em-
barked on a crusade to expand the prerogatives of business in the face of a
growing challenge from the laboring classes. The weapons this activist judi-
ciary provided to management were many and varied. In Ex Parte Young,41
for example, the Supreme Court de-fanged the Eleventh Amendment's pro-
hibition against suits against the states. Progressive and labor forces had
succeeded in passing many social welfare statutes in state capitals.42 Ex
151 (1982).
36. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
37. Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941). See also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act which statutorily ends employment-at-will doctrine where the reason for the
discharge relates to collective or union activity of workers).
38. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). See also Fresh
Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
39. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
[T]he significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. We
have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of means of livelihood...
While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is
likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous
job.
Id. at 543.
40. The unprotected position of the employee-at-will may be likened to the vulnerable
position of the tenant-at-will in American landlord-tenant law. See generally Armstrong &
LaMaster, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: Louisiana Institution, Common Law Inno-
vation, 46 LA. L. REV. 195 (1985); Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing:
Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1213 (1983).
41. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
42. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 489-92 (1973).
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Parte Young thus made the regulatory activities of state officials against
large corporations subject to federal court jurisdiction, at that time a forum
quite hospitable to business interests.
During this historical period the judiciary also pioneered the use of
equitable remedies against unions. Federal courts became known for "Gat-
ling Gun" injunctions in labor disputes because of the number and fre-
quency of equitable decrees granted employers in management-labor con-
frontations. 43 An astonishingly large number of court decrees were utilized
to combat unionization in general, and strike activities in particular. 44
Frankfurter and Greene note that in this period injunctions against strikes
and strike activities "grew in volume like a rolling snowball.' 45 One scholar
has documented 1,845 injunctions issued against labor-sponsored activities
between the years 1880 and 1931. 46 In 1895, at the same time the employ-
ment-at-will rule was being adopted by state courts, the United States Su-
preme Court ratified the use of the labor injunction by affirming the jailing
of Eugene Debs, leader of the Pullman strike of 1894.47 Use of the federal
injunctive power was highly selective, however. At the same time, the Court
was denying equitable relief to disenfranchised black voters being purged
from Southern voting rolls.48
The federal courts, during the same period, turned the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act,49 a statutory measure obviously aimed at countering manufac-
turers' control over price and supply, into a weapon against labor unions. In
1908, the Supreme Court held a secondary boycott of a retailer doing busi-
ness with a hat manufacturer to be a violation of the Sherman Act and
sustained treble damages against individual employees.50 The Court also
created the state action doctrine to restrict the scope of the post American
Civil War amendments,51 while constitutionally sanctioning the develop-
ment of de jure segregation.5"
43. E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 218 (1936). This abusive use of
equitable powers in labor disputes led to the passage of the Norris LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70
(1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982)).
44. One federal judge noted "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing,
any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful robbing, or lawful lynching." Atch-
eson, T. & S. F. R.R. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (D. Iowa 1905) quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra
note 42, at 488-89.
45. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 21 (1930) quoted in
FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 487-88.
46. E. WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 84 (1932).
47. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
48. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
49. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
50. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
51. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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In parallel doctrinal developments, the Supreme Court created two in-
terrelated constitutional themes as methods of checking legislative attempts
to deal with the economic power of the newly emergent giant corporations:
substantive due process, and limits on Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
Substantive due process (and its cousin "liberty of contract")53 enabled
courts to strike down a wide variety of statutes aimed at regulating business
and redressing social ills. Lochner v. N.Y.,5" which invalidated a New York
statute limiting working hours in a bakery to sixty per week and ten per
day, is usually seen as the archetypical judicial intervention on behalf of
business. 55 The Court soon also sharply curtailed Congress' power to regu-
late goods in interstate commerce. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,56 federal reg-
ulation of child labor was found unconstitutional. State and local power
over these subjects was likewise held unconstitutional as a violation of sub-
stantive due process.57 The net result of these lines of cases was to produce,
in Professor Corwin's phrase, a "political 'no man's land'-58 in which no
governmental body could constitutionally control business interests.
In sum, it was an age of unbridled laissez-faire capitalism, and judicial
activism in support of management. The employment-at-will rule neatly co-
incided with the dominant business oriented ideology of the time. The effect
of that rule was to strip most workers of the legal protection of a contract
of employment and to grant employers absolute power over their workers.
53. The concept of "liberty of contract" was defined in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
The "liberty" mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen . . . to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all con-
tracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Id. at 589. Allgeyer was the first time a statute had been found unconstitutional on Substan-
tive Due Process grounds.
54. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
55. See L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917
138-66 (1971).
56. 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918). "[P]roduction of articles, intended for interstate com-
merce, is a matter of local regulation." See also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895) (distinguishing between manufacture and commerce, thus creating barrier to Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce).
57. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Washington D.C. Ordinance
regulating minimum wages for women and children unconstitutional under fifth amendment);
Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (same under fourteenth amendment); Morehead v.
New York ex reL Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927) (state regulation of prices unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment).
58. E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 34-35 (1934).
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III. STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL INROADS TO AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT
The doctrinal bases for the at-will employment rule have long disap-
peared, never to be revived. Freedom of contract as a constitutional princi-
ple ended in the cases during the Great Depression. 9 The path was thus
opened for statutory regulation of the workplace, primarily by the federal
government. The general theme of such legislation is that public interven-
tion is necessary to protect applicants and employees from the overwhelm-
ing economic power of their employers.
In this legislation, the prior presumption of equality of bargaining
power is explicitly rejected. 0 Specific goals of these statutes include: pro-
moting unionization and collective bargaining as a countervailing force
against employer economic strength and workplace control;"' establishing a
floor of economic security for workers;6" outlawing discrimination against
minorities in employment decisions; 3 protecting employee health and
59. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 33-35.
61. The first major legislative abrogation of Wood's Rule in favor of organizational
rights was the 1926 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982). The statute was
amended in 1936 to cover air carriers, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1982). In 1935, rights of most Ameri-
can workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and mutual aid and protection were
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(1935). In adopting the NLRA, Congress found an "inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association ....
National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Under section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate in regard to hiring, tenure of employ-
ment, or any term or condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage union
membership, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
Similar protection against discriminatory discharges of employees for union support is
also afforded by many state laws. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 704(5) (McKinney 1977);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-105(5) (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 4(3)
(West 1982); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.16 (West 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
211.6(1)(c) (Purdon 1964).
62. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
63. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1982), makes it an
unlawful employment practice for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Subsequent federal legisla-
tion prohibited discrimination in employment based on age, Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (prohibiting age based
discrimination against persons between the ages of 40 and 70), or based on handicap, Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 et. seq. (1976).
Similar protection against discrimination in employment is found in various state statutes
and local ordinances. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
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safety;"' and guaranteeing a minimum level of security for retirement and
for the survivors of wage earners. 5 The employment-at-will doctrine has
also been altered by "whistle blower" statutes which provide reinstatement
and back-pay to discharged employees who have reported, or testified at
proceedings against, employer violations of environmental or safety stan-
dards. Illustrative federal statutes include the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974;66 the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act;6 7 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act;68 the Railroad Safety Act;69 and the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970.70 Such protections of workers are
essential to effective enforcement of regulatory statutes. Many state and
local legislative enactments mirror these federal restrictions on employers.7 '
12940(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 292, 296 (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (Baldwin 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
955 (Purdon Supp. 1988). Among the many state statutes which prohibit discriminatory dis-
charge because of physical handicap are, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (West Supp. 1988);
N.Y. EXEc. LAW§ § 292, 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-87-2
(1984).
64. Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
65. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (Social Security)
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-41 (1982) (prohibits discharge of employees in
order to prevent them from attaining vested pension rights).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982), 29 C.F.R. § 24 (1987) (no employer shall discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee who has "assisted or participated or is about to
assist or participate in any manner in ... a proceeding [under the Act] or in any other action
to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended." 42
U.S.C. § 5851 (a)-(3) (1982).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982) (an employer may not discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any employee because the employee commenced, caused to commence or testified at a
proceeding against the employer for violation of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act;
reinstatement and compensatory damages, including back pay, are available).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982) (no employer may discharge or discriminate against an
employee for instituting a proceeding or testifying at a proceeding against the employer for a
violation of the Act; reinstatement and compensatory damages may be awarded).
69. 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1982) (a railroad company engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce may not discharge or discriminate against an employee because the employee has
filed a complaint, instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings under or related to the
enforcement of the federal railroad safety laws, or has testified or is about to testify at such a
proceeding). See also 45 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1982) (prohibits discharge or discrimination
against an employee for refusing to work under hazardous conditions; reinstatement and back
pay may be awarded).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982) (prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating
against employees who have filed a complaint or instituted a proceeding against the employer
for violations of the Act; Reinstatement and back pay may be awarded). See Whirlpool Corp.
v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 10 (1980).
71. Numerous state statutes seek to control employer power in different factual con-
texts. State restrictions on the use of lie detectors include, Psychological Stress Evaluators and
Employment Law, N.Y. LAB LAW § 733-39 (McKinney 1988) (prohibits discharge for refus-
ing to take "psychological stress evaluator examination," filing a complaint, or testifying under
the statute); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988) (prohibits employer from
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All of the above statutes curtail the freedom of contract doctrine upon
which the employment-at-will rule is based. They also provide minimum
requirements of fairness, reasonable conduct, and consistency with publicly
defined policies as part of any employment contract.
Another major exception to the employment-at-will doctrine was cre-
ated in the public sector. Civil service laws for federal and state employees
provide job security. 72 These systems have long restricted discharge to a
"just cause" standard and provided procedural due process protections to
the aggrieved employee. Public employees also were able to call upon con-
stitutional protections as a defense against arbitrary employer action. While
no one has a right to a public job, the state cannot condition employment
on forfeiture of constitutionally protected freedoms.73 A teacher, for exam-
ple, who publicly criticized her school board employer could not be dis-
charged for expressing ideas on a matter of legitimate public concern. 4 Po-
litical patronage systems have been curbed under the same doctrinal
analysis. 5
Unionization of the workforce created collective bargaining, the last
major exception to at-will employment. Such bargaining, and the attendant
collective agreement, restricts the employer's unilateral control over the
job.76 Contract rights are thus established, together with a measure of in-
demanding or requiring "polygraph" or "lie detector" test of prospective or current employ-
ees). State statutes protecting political activity of employees include, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §
107(1) (McKinney 1983) (prohibits discharge on account of non-subversive political opinions,
affiliations, or contributions); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971). State protection of jury
duty is found in N.Y. JUD. LAWS § 532 (McKinney 1975) (prohibits discharge of employees
who, upon notice to employer, answer summons to serve as jurors); CAL. LAB CODE § 230
(West Supp. 1988). State protection of "whistleblowing" is found in MICH. STAT. ANN. §
15.362 (Callaghan 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(m) (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833 (1987). For a public policy discussion of whistleblowing, see Com-
ment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "'Blows the Whistle". A Cause of
Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777.
72. With respect to federal civil service employees, see Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a), 7513(a) (1982) (discharge of federal civil employees is permitted
only "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service"). Federal civil service em-
ployees receive greater protection from discrimination and unjust discharge than state and
local government employees. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 171
Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 nn.10-11, modified, 117 Cal. App. 3d 520 (1981); Peck, Unjust Dis-
charges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. I, 21-22
(1979). With respect to due process protection of state and local public employees, see Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (where a public employee's "liberty" or property inter-
ests are at stake, he is entitled to due process protections of notice and hearing); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985).
73. Keyeshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967).
74. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
75. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
76. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss1/7
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
dustrial democracy. Federal and state statutes mandate this sharing of
power with duly selected union representatives .7 7 Almost all unionized em-
ployees have a clause in their collective bargaining agreement that prohibits
discharge except for "just cause," with appeals to third-party arbitration in
cases of dispute .7  These provisions supersede the employment-at-will rule
by express contractual provision.
IV. JUDICIALLY-CRAFTED EXCEPTIONS TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
With minor exceptions,'7 there has been no major legislative intrusion
into the employer-employee relationship since the early 1970s. Despite the
developments cited in the previous section, more than half of the American
workforce remains "at will" and subject to arbitrary employer action. The
total number of private sector workers in 1985 was approximately 81.2 mil-
lion.80 The percentage of unionized employees has been shrinking steadily;""
the latest figures indicate that less than eighteen percent of the workforce is
unionized. 2 The number of discharges in this unorganized workforce is
hard to calculate with precision, but is undoubtedly extremely large. Un-
published Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics figures show that between
1959 and 1971 the mean annual discharge rate in the manufacturing sector
was 4.6 percent.8 3 A Michigan State University study based on responses
from 265 Michigan employers found an annual discharge rate of 6.8 per-
cent for non-office employees and 5.3 percent for office employees during
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question aris-
ing thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
77. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer- . . . (s) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
78. Such arbitration provisions can be found in an estimated ninety-six percent of all
labor contracts. A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 705
(10th Ed. 1986). Many arbitrators will infer a "just cause" limitation, even if it is not ex-
pressly contained in the collective agreement. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION
WORKS 651 (4th ed. 1985).
79. See, e.g., the state "whistleblower" statutes collected in supra note 71.
80. Current Labor Statistics, 109 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 57, 80 (Nov. 1986).
81. While the number of employees unionized has increased because of growth in the
workforce, the percentage in unions has steadily decreased. In 1956, thirty-four percent of
private nonagricultural workers were organized. By 1980 that had declined to twenty-four per-
cent. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 221 (1984).
82. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 409 (1987).
83. Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 559
(1985).
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1980.84 If these figures are even approximately accurate, we may estimate
that several million at-will employees are discharged each year, without the
right to a hearing by an impartial decision-maker. 85 Given present legal
rules, it is impossible to determine the percentage of these discharges that
took place without "just cause." If discharges of at-will employees are at all
analogous to discharges of unionized employees, the number of aggrieved
employees must be quite large. Studies of published arbitration decisions
indicate that in over fifty percent of contested discharge cases the employer
did not present sufficient evidence to justify the discharge.86 It is apparent
that very large numbers of employees are affected by the at-will rules.
While many employers have not utilized the dominant position pro-
vided by American employment law, numerous reported court cases provide
insight into the potential for abuse. The published cases may be viewed as a
cardiogram, detecting forces at work in the workplace. Reported opinions
involve employees fired for reporting alleged accounting improprieties of su-
pervisors, 87 filing worker's compensation claims,88 refusing the sexual ad-
vances of supervisors,89 serving on juries,90 refusing to participate in illegal
price-fixing agreements, 91 as well as a host of other chilling examples of
overreaching employer power. Given the difficulties and expense of litiga-
tion for discharged employees, these suits are indicative of numerous other
unreported and unlitigated abuses in the workplace.
Faced with these situations, courts have begun to reexamine the at-will
doctrine.9 2 A recent survey of the West Regional Reporter series and the
84. Id.
85. Professor Stieber calculates approximately two million at-will employees are dis-
charged each year. Id. at 558.
86. G. ADAMS, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION OF DISCHARGE CASES 41 (1978); Holly, The
Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Case Study, 10 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 16 (1957). These
calculations would result in almost one million unjust dismissals per year, given the assumption
in the text. This number may, however, be artificially inflated because not every discharged
employee will ask for an independent investigation of the discharge and only a small selected
group of cases proceed to arbitration.
87. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
88. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Segal
v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Loucks v. Star City Glass
Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
89. Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
90. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
91. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980).
92. The judicial re-examination of employment-at-will was preceded and accompanied
by extensive academic debate. Scholarly analysis of the doctrine began in a seminal 1967
article, Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). Since that time, numerous commenta-
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specialized Labor Cases system of Commerce Clearing House found ap-
proximately 500 published decisions involving at-will employees between
January 1980 and July 1986."3 A far larger number of cases, obviously, are
unreported, settled, or never brought at all. The state courts, in responding
to such situations, have begun to serve as "laboratories," 94 testing new legal
theories as means of altering the existing common law employment rules.
This judicial re-examination has produced innovative doctrinal devel-
opments which permit terminated workers to bring "wrongful discharge"
actions for reinstatement and/or damages. While these suits are often
based on traditional common law torts 5 or violations of anti-discrimination
laws,96 wrongful discharge claims can also be premised on several other the-
ories. These theories include claims that the firing violated "public policy,"
breached an "implied contract," or breached an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing between employer and worker.
A. Public Policy Exceptions
The most widely accepted limitation by courts on the at-will rule has
been the so-called "public policy exception," utilized in approximately half
of the American states . 7 The rationale for this exception is the duty of the
tors have examined its origins and contemporary applications. Among the most important are:
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118
(1976); Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay
on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457 (1979); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employ-
ment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, The Rights of
Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees:
Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082 (1984); Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481
(1976); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Ter-
minate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Commission on Labor and Em-
ployment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc.
N.Y.C.B.A. 170 (1981).
93. Hames, The Current Status of the Doctrine of Employment-At-Will, 39 LAB. L.J.
19 (1988).
94. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State lee Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
95. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355
N.E.2d 315 (1976) (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
96. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Perks v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (claim of violations of Pennsylvania Human Relations Act joined with intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress).
97. A sampling of the decisions permitting an exception to the at-will rule in cases
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employer to refrain from firing an employee for reasons that contravene
fundamental principles of public policy.98 The factual patterns in these
cases revolve around discharges for refusing to commit unlawful acts, or for
performing important public obligations, or for exercising statutory rights.
The policies underlying this exception are not derived from any agreement
between the employer and employee. They emerge, instead, from the em-
ployment relationship and its connection to the rule of law in society; in
effect, a judicial application of societal judgments of right and wrong to the
employee's termination. Such actions for wrongful discharge are thus best
viewed as tort rather than contract actions.9"
The first notable judicially-crafted exception to the at-will doctrine
came in a 1959 California case, Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 396.100 In Petermann, an employee of a labor organiza-
tion alleged that he was discharged for refusing to commit perjury before a
where the discharge violates a statute or other important public policy includes: Larson v.
Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 296,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 291 Md. 631, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton
R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App.
644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1978) (dictum), ayfd, 70 A.D.2d 791,
416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975);
Walsh v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290
N.W.2d 536 (1980) (dictum).
A useful compilation of modern cases accepting or rejecting limits on the employment-at-
will rule is contained in H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW & PRACTICE § 1.12 (2d ed.
1987).
98. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330,
1335-36, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980) (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts 613 (4th ed.
1971)).
99. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140
(1981) (plaintiff articulated a public policy sufficient to allow a wrongful discharge action).
Professor Peter Linzer, editorial reviser of the Second Restatement of Contracts has argued in
a provocative article that the traditional distinctions and classifications between Contract,
Tort, and Property are no longer useful. He maintains common law courts should approach
problems in a functional fashion, assigning rights and duties in light of specific factors charac-
terizing the relationship between the parties (e.g., relative power, express or implie assent,
fairness, etc.). Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986). I believe Linzer is correct, but
courts continue to utilize formal definitions in deciding practical questions of statutes of limita-
tions, measure of damages, etc..
100. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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legislative committee at the specific direction of his employer. California
courts had previously adhered strictly to the at-will doctrine. The California
Supreme Court emphasized that state law prohibited the commission of
perjury as well as the suborning of perjury. Although these laws gave no
specific remedy to a plaintiff-employee, "the law must encourage and not
discourage truthful testimony. The public policy of this state requires that
every impediment, however remote to the above objective, must be struck
down when encountered."' 1 The court did not attempt to define "public
policy" specifically. It did offer the following:
By "public policy," is intended that principle of law which holds
that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good. [It is] princi-
ples under which freedom of contract or private dealing is re-
stricted by law for the good of the community. 2
Since Petermann, many courts have held that an employer is not free
to discharge an employee for conduct that would subject the worker to
criminal prosecution, or would violate a state statute. 0 3 The condition of
the employee in this circumstance is that of a helpless prisoner, caught be-
tween the employer's demand for active participation in criminal or illegal
actions and his own job security. Using similar reasoning, courts have re-
fused to allow job retaliation against employees engaged in a variety of
important civic responsibilities, such as jury service.10 4
Another judicially-crafted "public policy" exception to the employer's
right to discharge involves firings for the exercise of statutory rights. In
these cases, employees have been discharged for filing claims for worker's
101. Id. at 186, 344 P.2d at 27.
102. Id. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981), Justice Simon attempted to define public policy in these broad terms:
When a discharge contravenes public policy in any way the employer has committed a
legal wrong .... But what constitutes clearly mandated public policy? . . .[I]t can be
said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the
State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they
are silent, in its judicial decisions .... [The] matter must strike at the heart of a citi-
zen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.
Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (citations omitted).
103. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusal to
participate in illegal price fixing scheme); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refusal to participate in illegal price fixing
scheme); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to falsify pollution control reports).
104. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for jury
service); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (refusal to
avoid jury service by committing perjury).
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compensation, 105 for refusing to take polygraph tests where state law out-
laws them,106 or for exercising other legislatively granted rights. 0 7 The ju-
dicial reasoning here is analytically similar to the issues presented to federal
courts when determining whether a private individual may imply a cause of
action from a statute with no explicit right to sue.' 8 The court must discern
legislative intent and create a remedy if intent to protect plaintiffs class is
found.
Despite these promising analytical possibilities, discharged employees
frequently find little judicial protection under the public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine. Many state courts reject any change in the established
law.'09 Others find the claimed public policy too unclear"10 or too general','
105. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979);
Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1981).
107. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (discharge to pre-
vent vesting of pension protected by statute).
108. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See, e.g., Cloutier v. Great A & P. Tea Co., 121
N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) (the court found public policy embodied in the federal
OSHA statute, and implied a cause of action); Hentzel v. The Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d
290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (same for California OSHA statute).
109. A number of states have expressly declined to recognize a cause of action for al-
leged terminations in violation of public policy. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352
So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (discharge of employee allegedly for refusing to falsify medical
records); Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (discharge for allegedly filing a worker
compensation claim and consulting an attorney); DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360
So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (1980) (employee discharged
after bringing personal injury action against his employer's stores); Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co.,
470 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Texas law); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364
So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251
S.E.2d 51 (1978).
110. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 40, 432 A.2d 464, 470-
71 (1981) (whistleblowing about falsified business records did not effectuate clear public
policy).
111. Several courts have refused to modify the employee-at-will doctrine based upon the
statements of policy found in state licensing provisions. In Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical
Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978), the plaintiff was a professional nurse respon-
sible for the staffing of nurses on her unit. She objected to the failure of the hospital to provide
sufficient personnel needed to meet the needs of her patients. Unable to resolve the dispute, she
was discharged, and brought a suit for wrongful termination relying on the legislative declara-
tion that nurses were to act consistently with the health and safety of their patients. The court
noted that while other courts had found exceptions to the at-will doctrine, they did so only
where "a specifically enacted right and duty" had been violated. Id. at 468, 590 P.2d at 515.
The court concluded the legislature, in mandating that nurses be licensed, did not intend to
overturn the common-law rule of at-will employment, and sustained the discharge. See also
Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982), where a
senior auditor alleged discharge in retaliation for discovering and reporting poor internal man-
agement and questionable procedures. The Michigan Supreme Court found the case involved
only a "corporate management dispute and lacks the kind of violation of a clearly mandated
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to protect discharged workers. Often recovery is denied where no statute
specifically requires reporting improper or illegal conduct."1 2 Courts often
view such a firing as an internal corporate management dispute, lacking
public significance. 113 Recovery has likewise been denied where no explicit
statute existed," 4 (although public policy ought not be restricted to statu-
tory formulation), or where administrative relief is available." 5 The unpre-
dictability of these results, and the heavy costs and delay inherent in litiga-
tion, act to deter and hinder employees from reporting violations of law and
vindicating important social interests. In a subsequent section, I shall argue
that, at a minimum, professional employees acting in conformity with their
ethical obligations under an accepted code of ethics should be able to assert
a cause of action under this public policy exception.
B. Implied Contract Exceptions
In a number of states, contract doctrine has been used to allow the
discharged employee to show a promise of job security implied from sur-
public policy that would support an action for retaliatory discharge." Id. at 694, 316 N.W.2d
at 712 (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (em-
ployee discharged for advising employer's counsel of violations by his superiors of the federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act); Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979)
(employees discharged for reporting to company official solicitation by their immediate superi-
ors of kickbacks from company suppliers); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,
319 A.2d 174 (1974) (employee discharged for advising corporate officer that product was
unsafe).
113. See, e.g., Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas. Co., 412 Mich. 692, 696, 316
N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982).
114. See, e.g., Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 211 Cal Rptr.
540 (1985) (cause of action for violation of public policy must have statutory support); Read v.
City of Lynwood, 173 Cal. App. 3d 437, 219 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1985).
115. See, e.g., Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (no
public policy tort pleaded under state employee safety statutes providing administrative reme-
dies); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 124 II1. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d 1137 (1984) (no public
policy tort for violation of state age discrimination statute); Tombollo v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d
23, 25 (S.D. 1984) (no tort cause of action for sexual harassment within jurisdiction of state
human rights commission); Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 1984)
(common law tort claim cannot be based on the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, because
that statute provides its own administrative remedies); Melley v. Gillette Corp., 19 Mass. App.
Ct. 511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (1985) (no public policy tort for age discrimination prohibited by
state statute; must seek administrative remedies); Ohlsen v. DST Industries, Inc., 111 Mich.
App. 580, 314 N.W.2d 699 (1981) (employee who refused to work in allegedly unsafe condi-
tions has no cause of action for dismissal, since the worker must rely on the administrative
remedy available under the protective statute which confers such rights); Ficalora v. Lockheed
Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1987) (retaliatory discharge claim pre-
empted by California Fair Employment and Housing Act); Portillo v. G.T. Price Prods., Inc.,
131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982) (worker's compensation statute provides
exclusive remedy for termination following claim for benefits).
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rounding facts. In this category of cases, courts have utilized the employer's
personnel handbook as a contractual obligation,116 and have applied tradi-
tional theories such as promissory estoppel' 17 and quasi-contract115 to pro-
tect employee reliance or to enforce employer promises. Employers have
been quick to blunt the effect of these developments, however, even in the
few states adopting them, by inserting, on applications and in employee
handbooks and personnel policies, disclaimers of intent to provide contrac-
tual rights. Many courts have found such disclaimers effective. 19
116. Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980) (both oral statements in a job interview and employee handbook statements that
referred to "just cause" for dismissal are deemed to be incorporated into the employment
contract, and can change at-will employment status to one which requires just cause for dis-
charge); Damrow v. Thumb Cooperative Terminal, Inc., 126 Mich. App. 354, 337 N.W.2d
338 (1983) (handbook statements outlining progressive discipline policy may produce contrac-
tual obligation to utilize such steps prior to discharge); Cain v. Allen Elec. Equip. Co., 346
Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956) (handbook statements providing for the payment of sever-
ance pay may be enforceable); Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1983) (handbook statements regarding a probationary period may imply a "just cause" re-
quirement for terminations after this period); Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976) (worker is not an at-will employee where an employer
tells employees at time of hire that it will not terminate arbitrarily, but only for cause); Pugh
v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (implied contact not
to terminate arbitrarily inferred from surrounding circumstances, such as length of employ-
ment and quantity of work); Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp.Dist., 135 Cal. App.
3d 896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982) (employee handbook may be part of employment contract
and can constitute a promise of future employment); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99
N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) (in the absence
of a clear and prominent disclaimer, an implied promise in an employee handbook that work-
ers will only be terminated "for cause" can be enforced against the employer, even though the
employment was for an indefinite term and would otherwise be terminable at will).
117. See, e.g., O'Shea v. RCA Global Communications, 117 LRRM (BNA) 2280
(D.N.J. 1984) (court enforced employer's promise to make severance payments upon discharge
of employees if jobs become obsolete, since employee continued to work after this expression in
reliance upon these new terms of service); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d
114 (Minn. 1981); (pharmacist resigned prior job in reliance on offer from employer); Rowe v.
Noren Pattern and Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (employee left
former position only to be fired two days before end of probationary period).
118. Frederick v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
119. See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (a wrongful discharge suit cannot be sustained where the employment application spe-
cifically states that employment may be terminated by either party at any time with or without
cause); Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1986); Batchelor v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1484-85 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (identical "disclaimer"
yielded the same conclusions that Sears avoided a "just cause" standard for discharge through
clear statements of at-will status); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 69 Md. App. 325,
517 A.2d 786, 789-94 (1986) (enforced a handbook disclaimer that the document "does not
constitute an express or implied contract"; handbook did not indicate any intention to limit the
hospital's discretion to discharge only for cause since it expressly negated any contract); Gi-
anaculas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (disclaimer on
employment application stating that employment was on an "at will" basis barred claim that
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The most important potential contract remedy is judicial recognition of
an implied term in the employment contract to discharge only for just
cause, or to act only in good faith. Some courts have recognized such im-
plied obligations, even in the absence of a writing, supported by the em-
ployee's performance of services over time. 120 The employer's just cause
promise may be implied by communication of express job security assur-
ances, longevity of employment, or formulation of discharge policies com-
mon to the industry. In essence, of course, courts in this analysis are simply
utilizing normal contract principles, i.e., considering all surrounding cir-
cumstances, including reasonable expectations of the parties, to determine
the existence of the implied promise.
An implied good faith obligation is present in most commercial con-
tracts.1 2' The California Court of Appeals has noted that the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing should be recognized because "certain ...
rights to job security [are] necessary to ensure social stability in our soci-
ety."'122 Indeed, beyond the immediate economic and psychological impact
of a discharge, fired workers sustain longer periods of unemployment than
workers who are unemployed for other reasons. Studies have shown that the
job search of discharged workers is significantly longer than the job search
of persons who had quit or been laid off.' 2 One court has even held this
covenant of good faith exists independent of the agreement of the parties.
Violation by the employer is thus a tort, which qualifies for punitive
damages. 124
But this theory has also provided only limited relief. This analysis has
employee handbook established implied contract to discharge workers without good cause);
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 622
(1984) (express terms of an employment contact may not be contradicted by terms implied in
fact).
120. The California courts have led in fashioning these analyses. See, e.g., Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (termina-
tion of long-term employee without cause violates the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied in the employment contract); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312,
1318 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (longevity of service to employer and
existence of representations (oral or in personnel policies) show an implied promise not to deal
arbitrarily with employees); Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. C-84-3-230 (S.F. Supe-
rior Court 1987) (discharge of computer programmer for refusing to submit to drug test
breached covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
121. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d
654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958). "There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Id.
122. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729
(1980).
123. Rodgers & Stieber, Employee Discharge in the 20th Century: A Review of the
Literature, 108 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 35, 39 (Sept. 1985).
124. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
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been adopted in relatively few states. "It would be incongruous to say that
an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provi-
sion which would be destructive of his right of termination," held New
York's highest court. 25 A covenant of good faith has been used only where
manifest injustice would result if the discharge were allowed.12 6 Moreover,
an important limiting factor under all these contract theories is that dam-
ages are far more restricted in contract than in tort.Y21
In sum then, since the end of the nineteenth century, employment law
has basically recognized no legally enforceable interest in the worker. For a
time, this doctrine had a constitutional overlay. When that ended in the
Great Depression, legislation began to protect small, discrete portions of the
workforce. Collective bargaining ended total employer control in unionized
workplaces, and civil service and constitutional protections ameliorated the
position of public employees. Some common law courts have now begun to
view the transaction in more functional terms, employing tort and contract
doctrines. These legal developments have been episodic, rather than smooth,
and geographically diverse. Most of the labor force remains at-will, subject
to discharge or discipline for any reason or for no reason at all. This is
particularly true of professional employees.
V. CODES OF ETHICS As A PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO
EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL
The professional employee is often caught in a painful dilemma,
trapped between his status as an employee-at-will and his ethical responsi-
bilities. My thesis here is that courts and legislatures should recognize a
privilege on the part of such workers to refuse to perform acts clearly con-
trary to their obligations under the code of ethics by which they practice.
Such a privilege would form the basis for a cause of action against an em-
ployer who has discharged the professional for refusing to perform an un-
ethical act, or for affirmatively performing his ethical duty. The nature of
the professional's work, and society's interest in such ethical conduct, pro-
125. Murphy v. American Home Prods., Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232, 237, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983).
126. See Vasques v. National Geographic Society, 34 FEP Cases 295 (D. Md. 1982)
(no action allowed for employees allegedly discharged on basis of national origin on theory
that employer's conduct violated public policy); Hong v. Commodore Int'l, Ltd., 115 LRRM
4022, 4026 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (no implied covenant of good faith for employee of 81 days
where employer had no established policy regarding for cause dismissal); Newfield v. Insur-
ance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 445, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1984) (two years
tenure is not sufficient longevity of employment to give rise to implied covenant).
127. See, e.g., Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628
(1984) (refusal to allow recovery of mental distress damages for wrongful discharge in viola-
tion for an employment contract, limiting the plaintiff to remedies available for a cause of
action in contract).
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vide the bases for this public policy exception to the employee-at-will rule.
A profession is an occupation that regulates itself through required sys-
tematic training and collegial discipline. It is based in specialized knowl-
edge and is service oriented rather than profit oriented, as institutionalized
in its code of ethics. 28 These three unique characteristics of professional
work and authority-collegial, cognitive, and ethical--demonstrate that
professionals are not simply purveyors of expert services in the commercial
marketplace. Each profession is subject to licensure, which creates a state
authorized monopoly over these services. 1" 9 The rationale for this monopoly
is based, at least in part, on a corresponding obligation of the professional
to regard duty to clients and to society as paramount to his own or his
employer's economic self-interest. Edward Pelligrino, Director of the Ken-
nedy Institute of Ethics, noted that the critical difference between a busi-
128. See generally Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession:
Psychology, Sociology, and Medicare, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 902 (1960). The National Labor
Relations Act defines a professional employee as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character
as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character
that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to
a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science
or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruc-
tion and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the perform-
ance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes ....
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982). For some of the attempts to define the essentials of a profession,
see Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession, HARV. EDUC. REV. Winter 1953, at 33-50.
129. Licensure of professionals in the United States has a lengthy history. Professional
associations, such as the American Medical Association, sponsored state licensing statutes dur-
ing the late 19th century, The Supreme Court gave impetus to this in Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114 (1889), which upheld the constitutionality of the West Virginia Medical Practice
Act. By 1930 all states had some form of mandatory medical licensure. See generally R. DER-
BYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1969). Many other
health care workers, such as dentists, optometrists, pharmacists, veterinarians, practical and
registered nurses, and dental hygienists are currently licensed in all 50 states. R. WEISFELD,
LICENSURE OF PRIMARY CARE PRACTITIONERS, A MANPOWER POLICY FOR PRIMARY HEALTH
CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 8 (1977).
The Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to state regulation and licensing of
professions:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions
within their boundaries and that as part of their power to protect the public heath, safety,
and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing prac-
titioners and regulating the practice of professions. We also recognize that in some in-
stances the state may decide that 'forms of competition usual in the business world may
be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.'
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (citations omitted). Agencies also
have the ability to regulate the practice of professionals. For example, the Secretary of the
Treasury has the authority to suspend or disbar from practice before the IRS an attorney or
an accountant who is shown to be "incompetent or disreputable." 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (1987).
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ness and a profession is that "at some point in a professional relationship,
when a difficult decision is to be made you can depend on the one who is in
a true profession to efface his own self interest."130 In effect, the profes-
sional is the trustee of his ethical responsibilities.
Ethical standards create a moral tie between the professional and the
public interest. The standards transform the sale of personal services into a
calling, one impressed with a service obligation. The professional's work, at
its best, reflects and shapes many of our country's distinctive and positive
humane values. Lawyers often act as a buffer between the criminally ac-
cused and the prosecutorial power of the state, 1 ' and ensure the review of
bureaucratic determinations. 32 Members of the bar have an obligation to
provide public interest representation without fee or at reduced fee.133 Doc-
tors are required to recognize responsibility not only to patients, but also to
"activities contributing to an improved community."' 34 Engineers must
"use knowledge. . . for the advancement of human welfare."'3 5 The public
trust and responsibility of the professional is enforced by licensing statutes,
peer review, civil damage suits, and ultimately even criminal statutes.136
These communally-created control mechanisms attempt to ensure adher-
ence to minimal standards. Violations of an ethical code will bring sanc-
tions. Removal of the privilege to practice in the profession where licenses
are required, and even civil and criminal penalties, may result from code
violations. 3 7 In addition, many professional ethical rules permit conduct,
but build in discretion, thus calling for individual professional judgment."3 8
130. BODINE & LUNDBERG, 50 Hours for the Poor, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 55 (quot-
ing Edward Pellegrino, director of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics).
131. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requires appointed counsel for indi-
gent defendant in capital cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (same for prose-
cution that may result in imprisonment of any term); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (same for indigent defendant accused of felony).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982) (right to counsel in administrative proceedings).
133. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Rule 6.1 (1983) [hereinafter MRPC]. "A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A
lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a re-
duced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations
.... Id.
134. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOCIATION, Revised PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, no.
VII (1980).
135. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1974).
136. See infra notes 146-51.
137. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1925(7) (1987). "Whoever shall violate stan-
dards of nursing practice as adopted by the Board shall be fined not more than $1,000, or be
imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Id.
138. MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 1.5 (lawyers shall consider a number of factors in
making fees reasonable). Rule 1.6(b) states that "A lawyer may reveal such information [re-
lating to representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
..... (emphasis added). Id.
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But social responsibility and independent judgment often produce con-
flict with an employer when a professional is a full time employee. Manage-
ment predictably focuses on loyalty to the enterprise3 9 and "bottom line"
profitability. These understandable goals, however, should not be permitted
to outweigh a good faith and reasonable adherence to professional obliga-
tions. Enlightened public policy should foster ethical activity by such em-
ployee-professionals and must, therefore, refuse to tolerate discharges moti-
vated by employee resistance to orders of superiors that are at variance
with public responsibilities.
The duties of professionals are typically expressed in a code of ethics,
or equivalent minimum standards of practice. Each recognized professional
group has such an organized body of standards.1,0 They constitute a public
admission of duties assumed, i.e., obligations imposed upon the practitioner
to maintain the integrity of practice. Containing both general and specific
provisions, such codes affirm the social importance of such services. Some
examples may illustrate this point. Despite the desire for maximum produc-
tivity, accountants' and lawyers' 4' are explicitly forbidden from handling
matters they know they are not competent to discharge. The ethical code of
the National Society of Professional Engineers requires engineers to regard
their duty to public welfare as paramount "to their duty to their employers
in situations where professional skill and knowledge may be contrary to
human welfare.' 4' 3
There are several reasons to carve an exception to the at-will doctrine
for professionals based on the codes of ethics. As noted earlier, each profes-
sion is based on distinctive knowledge and service to the community. Each
helps shape our culture in significant ways. Law, medicine, and other pro-
fessions play a direct role in the formation of public policy and its imple-
mentation. The practitioners in these highly trained professions possess spe-
cific skills needed to solve individual and communal problems. They must
be given the leeway to address these problems in a manner consistent with
ethical standards. 1 4 In addition, the at-will professional employee moti-
vated by ethical concerns attempts to correct a problem at the risk of the
substantial financial investment in his education, his long-term financial se-
139. "There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to
his employer." NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953).
140. See, e.g., supra notes 133-35, and infra note 141.
141. AICPA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDARDS, Rule
201 (1974).
142. MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 1.1; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 6-101(A) (1983).
143. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1974).
144. See generally JENNINGS, THE PUBLIC DUTIES OF THE PROFESSIONS, 17 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. I (1987).
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curity, and his career standing and reputation. Even if fortunate enough to
avoid dismissal (occupational capital punishment for the worker),"" the
professional employee may encounter more subtle retaliatory actions, such
as less desirable work assignments, loss of prestige, and decrease in promo-
tional and pay opportunities.
Moreover, state licensure exerts tremendous pressure upon the at-will
professional employee. These statutes grant regulatory bodies the power of
admission and expulsion from the profession. A professional license may be
revoked because of the violation of statutes that allow discipline because of
"unprofessional" or "unethical" conduct. The disciplinary statutes are
based on violations of codes of ethics and state-promulgated rules and regu-
lations.' " In medicine, Chief Justice Rugg of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court set forth the rationale for such requirements in 1921:
Soundness of moral fibre to insure the proper use of medical
learning is as essential to the public health as medical learning
itself. Mere intellectual power and scientific achievement with-
out uprightness of character may be more harmful than igno-
rance. Highly trained intelligence combined with disregard of
fundamental virtues is a menace.""
Character evaluation has likewise traditionally been part of the bar admis-
sion of lawyers and of their continued practice. Justice Frankfurter ex-
plained this requirement by noting:
lawyers stand as a shield. . . in defense of right and to ward off
wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities
there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a
high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest obser-
vance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the cen-
turies been compendiously described as "moral character."4
Professionals are also legally accountable for their actions. Professional
malpractice is based on breach of a duty of care which society imposes on
the professional."' Any private agreement between professional and client
145. In assessing procedural due process claims of public employees, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the "severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood." Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1984). The Court has also noted that a dis-
charged employee seeking new employment "will take some time and is likely to be burdened
by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job." Id.
146. See, e.g., Forziati v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 333 Mass. 125, 128 N.E.2d
789 (1955); Bell v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 101, 65 N.E.2d 184 (1952) (using the Ethical
Principles of the AMA as a guide in determining license revocations).
147. Lawrence v. Briry, 239 Mass. 424, 429, 132 N.E. 174, 176 (1921).
148. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
149. See Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979) (accountant's
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to disclaim such a publicly imposed duty would be unenforceable.' In
some limited instances, society may even impose criminal liability for ac-
tions related to professional work.''
Some examples from a variety of factual situations may demonstrate
the perilous position of the at-will professional employee. Doctors and
nurses working in the occupational health setting have ethical obligations to
promote and safeguard their clients' care and safety. 152 In many situations
these obligations require that they investigate and report information con-
cerning the effects of chemicals and other toxic substances in the work-
place. The employer of these health care personnel often has an economic
interest in not investigating and reporting such circumstances. Moreover,
the Occupational Health Code of Ethics states: "Occupational health
nurses should safeguard the employee's right to privacy by protecting infor-
mation of a confidential nature, releasing information only as required by
law or upon written consent of the employee.' 5 3 Management, however,
often demands information on the health status of a worker, even without
consent, in order to assess the employee's job performance or potential. The
nurse is also usually in a subordinate job role in the workplace.
In some situations the whistleblowing professional employee may vol-
untarily reveal damaging information to corporate officials rather than to
outsiders. This revelation may likewise bring down the wrath of superiors.
standard of care); Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975)
(standard by which lawyer is held negligent); Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal.
App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955) (malpractice liability of occupational health nurse); Prooth
v. Wallsh, 105 Misc. 2d 653, 432 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1980) (doctor's standard of care); Posnien v.
Rogers, 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975) (veterinarian's standard of care); Bridgman, Legal Mal-
practice - A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong Case, 30 S.C.L. REv. 213 (1979).
See generally Annotation, Negligence, Inattention or Professional Incompetence of Attorney
in Handling Client's Affairs as Ground for Disciplinary Action 96 A.L.R.2d 823 (1964); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299(A) (1965) (discussion of the standards by which pro-
fessionals are judged).
150. Tunkl v. Board of Regents, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 82 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)
(charitable hospital policy of having patients waive possible claims of negligence against hospi-
tal as a requisite to admission invalid as contrary to public policy); Emory Univ. v. Porubian-
sky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981) (dental clinic could not ask patients to waive right to
sue for negligence). See also Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice
Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 173 (1986); 57 AM. JUR.
2d Negligence § 35 (1971); MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 1.8(h); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102(A) (1983).
151. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982) (criminal penalties for materially false state-
ments in reports required by the SEC); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (same for false statements to
any government agency); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail fraud).
152. See, e.g., AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION CODE FOR NURSES, (1985) No. 3.1
("The nurse's primary commitment is to the health, welfare, and safety of the client.")
153. Klutas, Confidentiality of Medical Information, 25 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
NURSING 14 (1977).
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Recently a New York accountant, an employee of twenty-three years and
an assistant treasurer in a corporation, alleged that he had been fired for
revealing to top management an illegal accounting practice involving at
least fifty million dollars. Pension reserves had been improperly inflated,
allowing certain corporate officers to receive unwarranted bonuses by a
management incentive plan. He was fired for this disclosure, and the New
York Court of Appeals held that there was no statutory or common law
cause of action.1 5 4
The well-publicized case of Herbster v. North American Co. for Life
and Health Insurance,'" may illustrate the dilemma of the lawyer-em-
ployee. Herbster, the chief legal officer of an insurance company and an
employee-at-will, sued his employer after discharge. He alleged that docu-
ments in a pending suit against his employer had been demanded in discov-
ery proceedings and that he had been fired for refusing corporate demands
to destroy or hide the documents. The attorney maintained that manage-
ment's request would have forced him to violate the provisions of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility by misrepresenting facts to the court158
and suppressing evidence he had a legal obligation to produce. 57 Herbster's
suit for abusive discharge was summarily dismissed by the trial court be-
cause of the personal relationship inherent between attorney and client.' 58
The Illinois appellate court affirmed, despite the fact that obvious public
policies were implicated by the discharge. The court held that Herbster
could not utilize the normal Illinois retaliatory discharge cause of action
because of his professional status and relationship with his corporate cli-
ent.159 "The mutual trust, exchanges of confidences, reliance on judgment,
and personal nature of the attorney-client relationship"'' 60 precluded the ap-
plication of the retaliatory discharge tort to this situation.
The result in this and similar cases is unconscionable and should be
overturned. The professional ordered to do that which his ethical standards
forbid him to do should have a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Law-
yers may serve as an illustration. An individual client may dismiss her at-
154. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
155. 150 1ll. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986).
156. MRPC, supra note 133, Rules 3.3, 3.4; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 1-102(A) (5) (1986) ("A lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice."); Id. at DR 7-102(A) (3) ("[A] lawyer shall not ...
[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.").
157. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) (1986) ("A lawyer
shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or
produce.").
158. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
159. Id. at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
160. Id. at 29, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
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torney at any time and for any reason.16' Similarly, the lawyer may, under
most circumstances, withdraw at any time.16 2 These parties are typically in
an episodic, at-will relationship, in which each has many options. The full-
time employee-attorney required to act unethically is in a far different situ-
ation. His employer is his only client, wielding total economic power.
Clearly, lawyers and other professionals can be "employees."'1 3 Given the
intimate personal nature involved in many such relationships, as the Herb-
ster court recognized, reinstatement of the professional-employee may not
be feasible in some instances. Damages, including front pay, would then be
appropriate to the injury. In larger organizations, the professional should be
entitled to either resume his position or seek damages. Regardless of vary-
ing remedies, courts and legislatures should explicitly recognize the duty of
the professional to follow a clear mandate embodied in recognized profes-
sional standards. The position of Attorney Herbster was no different than
any other worker ordered to violate the law and discharged for his refusal
to comply. 4 The attorney is a helpless prisoner caught between the dic-
tates of the law and the economic power of his employer. Society should
refuse to countenance such choices.
Where adopted by the agency with jurisdiction over the bar, the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility or the new Model Rules have the effect
of law and set mandatory ethical standards for lawyers. 65 For example, a
lawyer may not initiate a frivolous lawsuit, no matter what instructions an
employer may transmit. 66 Acceding to such a demand risks discipline, up
161. MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 1.16(a)(3); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1986). See, e.g., Carlson v. Nopal Lines, 460 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.
1972); Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972); In re Phelps,
204 Kan. 16, 459 P.2d 172 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1397 (1977) ("no lawyer can continue to re-
present a client who does not wish to be represented").
162. MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 1.16(b) ("a lawyer may withdraw from representing
a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client").
163. The National Labor Relations Act clearly recognizes that professionals are employ-
ees for purposes of that statute. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982). See also Komel v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 56 Il. App. 3d 967, 372 N.E.2d 842 (1978) (employee cannot sue doctor-
employee because Workers' Compensation provides exclusive remedy); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF AGENCY § 223(a) (1958) ("[e]ven in the case of attorneys and physicians there may
be the master and servant relation .... ").
164. See cases collected supra notes 103-04.
165. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 26-30 (1953). See also Sperry v. Florida, 373
U.S. 379 (1963) (a state court has no jurisdiction to discipline a lawyer not licensed to practice
in that state); In re Van Beever, 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P.2d 790 (1940) (a lawyer's conduct is
subject to regulation by the jurisdiction in which he is licensed to practice). Cf. State v.
Pounds, 525 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (court retains jurisdiction to discipline attor-
ney who has left the state for acts committed while still practicing in state).
166. MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 3.1.
Moskowitz: Employment-at-Will & Codes of Ethics:  The Professional's Dilemma
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
64 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to and including disbarment. 1 7 Not only must the lawyer refuse to initiate
a frivolous lawsuit, if a supervising lawyer gives such an order the supervi-
sor must be reported to the appropriate disciplinary authorities, unless such
report would violate a legally protected privilege. 168 The ethical codes of
professions, other than law, can be enforced through licensure'6 9 and even
criminal statutes. 70 Each of these demonstrates a public determination that
ethical behavior on the part of the professional is of special concern to the
community.
Some courts have already acted to protect the professional-employee
faced with this dilemma. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has deter-
mined "an employer's right to discharge an employee-at-will carries a cor-
relative duty not to discharge an employee who declines to perform an act
that would require a violation of a clear mandate of public policy." ' The
court recognized that "in certain instances, a professional code of ethics
may contain an expression of public policy."17 In these circumstances "pro-
fessionals owe a special duty to abide not only by federal and state law, but
also by the recognized code of ethics of their professions.' 73 In a subse-
quent New Jersey case, a wrongful discharge claim was based on public
policy expressed both in state regulations regarding pharmacies and in the
Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Association. 74 The plain-
167. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 legal history (1984). See, e.g.,
People v. Kane, 655 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1982) (three year suspension for filing frivolous appeals);
In re Jafree, 93 II1. 2d 450, 444 N.E.2d 143 (1982) (lawyer disbarred for instituting numerous
frivolous and defamatory suits).
168. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A), EC 1-4 (1983) (A
lawyer having "unprivileged knowledge of a violation" of a Disciplinary Rule "shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation.") (emphasis added). The Model Rules take a less stringent approach and do not
require reporting if reasonable minds could differ. MRPC, supra note 133, Rule 5.2(b) ("A
subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in
accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of profes-
sional duty."); Rule 8.3(a) (requires informing the appropriate authority when the conduct
"raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
..... ) (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (West Supp. 1987) (grounds for suspension or
revocation of any certificate, registration or license by appropriate board); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 1922(a) (1981) (grounds for revocation of nursing license, including unprofessional
conduct). See also cases cited supra note 146; Murphy v. Rowland, 609 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980).
170. E.g., criminal liability may be imposed on accountants for making false statements
in reports required by the SEC or in his accounting or auditing responsibilities. 15 U.S.C. § 77
(1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (same for false statements to any government agency); 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail fraud).
171. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
172. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
173. Id.
174. Kalman v. Grand Union, 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1982).
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tiff, an at-will pharmacist, claimed that he was discharged when he refused
to cooperate with his employer's plan to operate an unstaffed pharmacy in a
supermarket. The employer's action violated state regulations which re-
quired a registered pharmacist to be on duty, and the pharmacist was re-
quired by the Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Association
to "expose, without fear or favor, illegal or unethical conduct in the
profession."17 5
The professional ordered to perform an unethical act is thus trapped in
the same dilemma faced by workers ordered to do acts barred by statute or
public policy. Numerous courts have imposed liability on an employer who
has discharged a worker for refusing to perform such acts.17 6 Similar treat-
ment should be accorded when the employer orders an act in violation of an
ethical code. If such standards can be used as a sword to punish the profes-
sional who transgresses them, they should likewise be a shield to protect the
professional who follows them. In this realm, autonomy and independent
judgment are crucial. Neither can exist without protection against reprisal.
Not every claim of adherence to a professional code of ethics will, of
course, be justified. In many instances the employer's discipline is based on
legitimate reasons that are far removed from any ethical considerations.
Management properly resents outside interference with employee relations.
A judicially developed exception to the at-will employment rule must con-
tain some limits to unnecessary interference. Two such limits appear com-
monly in other contexts and might be applied in this instance: the employee
must rely on a recognized professional code of ethics, and the claim must be
made in good faith and be reasonable as measured by an ordinary profes-
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-I (West 1978 and Supp. 1987) regulates the board of pharmacy in
New Jersey.
175. Kalman, 183 N.J. Super. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730 (emphasis in original); See also
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978). In O'Sullivan, a
paraprofessional x-ray technician was discharged for refusing to perform catheterization of a
patient. Id. The court held that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge might lie based on
New Jersey public policy favoring proper medical care and illegality of the procedure. Id.
176. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (discharge for violation of labeling and licensing statutes); Trombetta v. Detroit, To-
ledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to falsify pollution
reports); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (discharge for
reporting illegal overcharging practices on prepayment of installment loans); See also Local P-
1236, Amalg. Meat Cutters v. Jones Diary Farm, 519 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Wis. 1981), affid,
680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982). In this case a Wisconsin district court overturned an arbitra-
tor's decision upholding a meat processor's rule prohibiting employees from reporting contami-
nation problems to the U.S.D.A. Id. The worker had revealed violations to the agency. The
arbitrator viewed the rule as a reasonable means of ensuring internal management control.
The district court enjoined enforcement of the decision because it contravened public policy.
The rule prohibited employees from reporting violations even if unsanitary conditions were
uncorrected after being reported to management. Id.
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sional situated in a similar situation. Moreover, if effective internal proce-
dures for resolving such problems have been created,177 exhaustion of those
procedural mechanisms should be required.
Judicial and statutory protection for the ethical professional is long
overdue. Such protection would provide the individual employee with a
greater sense of security, without burdening the employer with unwarranted
obstacles to efficient personnel management. A significant disincentive to
achieving public purposes would be removed. Most importantly, meaningful
discussion of ethical norms would be stimulated, and conduct in conformity
with professional standards would be significantly encouraged.
VI. ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The preceding material on ethical conflict as an exception to the at-will
doctrine advocates recognition by courts and legislatures that professionals
have responsibilities beyond client loyalty and obedience to their employers.
I believe that management likewise has a responsibility to prevent unethical
acts, to avoid conflicts with professional employees, and to vindicate em-
ployees who refuse to engage in unethical conduct. Employers should ensure
that ethical conduct is a condition of employment. My thesis here is that
employers should be pro-active on this subject. Systems for resolving the
inevitable disputes between professional employees and their superiors
should voluntarily be put in place, and would benefit all concerned. The
approach proposed here is based on preventive education, voluntary media-
tion, and a final dispute-resolution process. Taken as a whole, such a sys-
tem, whether constructed within the firm or using outside arbitrators, could
substitute for wrongful discharge litigation based on ethical claims.
The essential attributes of such a system are clear. An educational ef-
fort should be required, apprising employees and supervisors of the relevant
ethical norms and heightening awareness of required behavior. When dis-
putes emerge about what ethical conduct requires, the system should pro-
duce prompt resolution, with opportunity for fair presentation of positions
by the opposing sides. An opportunity for mediation and conciliation is al-
ways appropriate. Open communication is indispensable. Resolution of the
dispute at this point allows the parties to frame their own agreement, with-
out outside interference. Advisory opinions may be useful before irrevocable
action is required. Measures for protection against reprisal or intimidation
must be present. A neutral decision making process should be available,
with professional mediators and arbitrators utilized where the size of the
organization makes this feasible. The range of presently available proce-
dural mechanisms includes mediation, arbitration, and peer review.
177. See notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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What advantages does such a private dispute resolution system pre-
sent? For the employer, it would avoid both the direct costs of litigation,
(the possibility of large jury verdicts,' attorney fees and other costs 179 ) as
well as the loss of productivity and disruption which attends court cases.
Experience teaches that employees who feel they have been heard and
fairly treated rarely sue.180 Such a system would enhance the employer's
image and status with its employees, and improve productivity and commu-
nication with valued professional employees. 8' A private dispute resolution
system would also be useful as a management tool, monitoring employer
policies in the day-to-day work environment of its professional employees.
The employer likewise has an interest in not having employees act in an
unethical manner. Violations of ethical codes may be used by the consumer
of the professional services as evidence of a breach of the legal duty owed to
the client, setting the stage for malpractice lawsuits. Such a mediation-arbi-
tration system may thus appropriately be viewed as a risk-management
tool, a means of assuring fewer negligence lawsuits against the organization
employing the professional.
Internal dispute resolution may also promote union avoidance, a factor
important to many employers. Employees may no longer view collective
bargaining as the sole means of assuring fairness for themselves. Moreover,
if employers do not voluntarily create a method of dispute resolution, they
will inevitably be confronted with litigation, or with new public dispute res-
olution systems far less palatable than one privately and voluntarily
178. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982)
(award of $1.9 million to three employees). In California, during 1982-86, plaintiffs in wrong-
ful discharge cases won 73 % of cases, and the average award was $652,100. Gould, The Idea
of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining
Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 885, 905. These statistics may present an exaggerated pic-
ture since California law on employment relations has moved much further than other states.
179. The cost of just the pretrial stages of a wrongful discharge suit can be more than
$10,000. Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 413 (1987). A speaker at a recent conference reported attorney's fees
in a typical wrongful discharge case totalled between $15,000 to $40,000, up to the summary
judgment phase alone. Alternative Dispute Resolution Applied to Employment Context, 5
Empl. Rel. Weekly (BNA) 477 (April 13, 1987). In addition, under many federal civil rights
laws, a losing employer must pay the employee's attorney's fees as well as its own. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k) (1982) (Title VII provisions for attorney's fees); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)
(ADEA statutory attorney's fees).
On the cost of litigation, see generally Olson, Controlling Litigation Costs: Some Propos-
als for Reform, LITIGATION, Summer 1976, at 16. See also Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe, Ex-
penses: The Roadblock to Justice, JUDGES J., Summer 1981, at 16, 17.
180. See, e.g, Alternative Dispute Resolution Said to Save Time, Money in Discharge
Actions, 5 Empl. Rel. Weekly (BNA) 208 (Feb. 16, 1987).
181. See, e.g., Coulson, Arbitration for the Individual Employee, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
406-13 (1979-80).
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constructed.
What incentive do professional employees have for using such a sys-
tem? First, the ordinary processes of court adjudication are extremely slow
and prohibitively expensive."" These factors are often determinative for
many individuals who feel themselves aggrieved, especially where the em-
ployee has been discharged. Moreover, the uncertainty and personal
anguish of such prolonged litigation often negatively affects the personal
and professional lives of these individuals. A lawsuit almost invariably
means an end to the relationship with the employer and can distract the
worker from renewed productive work. These results may not be in the
long-term interests of the individual. A professional employee will ordina-
rily prefer a private resolution of issues, particularly ethical ones, that re-
late to work performance. Employees thus have an interest in inexpensive,
prompt, and fair adjudication of ethical disputes within the organization.
There is also an important public interest in such private dispute reso-
lution systems. These systems would reduce the caseloads of state and fed-
eral agencies, especially equal employment opportunity agencies, over-
whelmed with backlogged cases."' 3 The load on courts would also be
182. The costs of litigating abusive discharge cases are often as great for plaintiff as
those for the defendant employer (see supra note 179), but the individual typically has far
fewer resources. The financial costs of a suit may thus make that course impossible. On the
delays inherent in common law adjudication, see generally Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?,
68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Lewin, New Alternatives to Litigation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1982 at
Dl, col. 1. "The average arbitration takes 141 days from filing to award, in contrast with the
national average of 20 months for a civil suit to get from filing to trial in the federal courts."
Id. at D2, col. 2.
The length of equal employment opportunity litigation, analogous to wrongful discharge
suits of professionals, is legendary. The pre-trial period may last years, with subsequent hear-
ings before district courts. See, for example, the history of Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 443
F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1977), a sex discrimination case first filed in 1967. "After more than
11 years, 387 docket entries here in the trial court, and 3,934 pages of transcripts, the case is
now before the court for an award of attorney fees." Id. at 698. See also Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1712 (5th Cir. 1978):
This case presents a striking illustration of the limitations of a court, and particularly an
appellate court, in resolving satisfactorily the complex and difficult issues that are raised
in the Title VII context. The questions before us today have been at once highly technical
and disturbingly elusive. They have required an examination of a voluminous and at
times impenetrable record and have necessitated an exceedingly lengthy opinion. After
twelve years in the courts and scores of pages of appellate consideration, we still cannot
say with confidence that the end of this struggle is in sight.
Id. at 1761.
183. The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission historically has been una-
ble to manage its caseload. The number of charges filed with the EEOC increased from 8,854
in fiscal year 1966 to 77,000 in fiscal year 1976. Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity
Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of
the Law 2 INDUs. REL. L.J. 1, 71 (1977). Clarence Thomas, Chairman of the EEOC, acknowl-
edged that the system for handling EEOC complaints of federal workers is "a bottleneck . ..
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lightened.1 8 4 Valuable discussion and precedents would accumulate within
firms and professions. Most significantly, equitable and impartial decision-
making regarding ethical issues would provide an important incentive to
such workers to abide by clearly defined ethical norms. Clients and the pub-
lic would benefit.
Can the use of a procedure such as that outlined above for professional
employees be made mandatory? While there is little precedent on this pre-
cise question, the answer should be yes. Arbitration of commercial disputes
has long been specifically enforceable." 5 The Supreme Court has given con-
sistent support to such alternate systems in a variety of contexts, emphasiz-
ing strong federal policies in favor of arbitration.' If fair procedures18
and voluntary agreement are present, such contracts should be binding.'
In a well known case, the Michigan Supreme Court noted "a written agree-
ment . . to discharge only for cause could . . provide for binding arbi-
tration on the issues and cause and damages."'8 9 With some limited excep-
tions, 90 failure to exhaust such dispute resolution remedies should bar a
a labyrinth." Federal Employee Discrimination Complaints: EEOC calls for Major Changes
in Processing System, 128 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 205 (June 13, 1988).
184. Between 1960 and 1980 the number of filings per capita in federal district courts
nearly doubled. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 668, 669 (1986).
185. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See
also Tac Travel Am. Corp. v. World Airways, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (claim
for libel and slander subject to arbitration under contract calling for the arbitration of "any
dispute between the parties with respect to this agreement").
186. In Shearson/American Express v. McMahan, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were held arbitrable where the parties had entered
into a valid, pre-dispute agreement, despite long-standing contrary precedent. Use of grievance
and arbitration machinery under the National Labor Relations Act is commonplace. See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 573 (1960).
187. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1987) (key proce-
dural elements included representation by counsel, ability to confront and present evidence,
and a neutral decision-maker).
188. See United States v. Eric Elevator Corp., 214 F. Supp. 947, 948 (D. Mass. 1963).
189. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 624, 292 N.W.2d 880, 897
(1980).
190. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that statutory Title VII claims were not preempted by an arbitration award. The same result
has been reached in other civil rights type claims. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas - Best
Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (employees not barred from suing under federal
F.L.S.A. after negative decision of grievance committee). See also Hoellering, Finality in Ar-
bitration: How Final?, 34 NYU NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 119, 123 (1982). In most of these
situations, however, the arbitration was part of a collective agreement signed by the union and
never signed by the individual employee. See, e.g., Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39-42. While
courts are reluctant to allow waiver of specific statutory civil rights, they are not adverse to
extra-judicial processes as a whole. At a minimum, they may thus uphold a contract provision
requiring arbitration as a condition precedent to the trial of a discharge case and accept only
review of arbitration decisions rather than undertake a full de novo examination of the case.
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later suit,'"' even for issues not raised in the proceeding. 192 Even if the em-
ployee raises a claim of abusive discharge based on a violation of public
policy, the agreement to arbitrate should be given effect.193
Whether subsequent court suits based on a violation of a professional
code of ethics, or some other public policy, may be absolutely precluded by
a prior neutral decision-maker's award has not been definitively settled. 94
Id. at 60 n.21. "We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral deci-
sion. . . ... Id. at 60. See generally Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual
Employment Disputes, 16 MICH. J.L. REF. 249, 268-71 (1983). A few wrongful termination
claims, based on strong public policy (e.g., protection of health and welfare), have also been
held not preempted by arbitration awards. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
191. See Fulghum v. U.P.S., 130 Mich. App. 375, 343 N.W.2d 559 (1983) (strong pol-
icy in favor of resolution and deference to arbitration decisions); Viestenz v. Fleming Compa-
nies, Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); Magnuson v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). See
generally Annotation, Exhausation of Grievance Procedures or of Remedies Provided in Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement as Condition of Employee's Resort to Civil Courts for Assert-
edly Wrongful Discharge, 72 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1960).
192. As to issues not raised in arbitration, see Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 I11.
App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980); Deatrick v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Funk Seas
Int'l, 109 II1. App. 3d 998, 441 N.E.2d 669 (1982).
Allowing claim and issue preclusion within a judicial system rests on the assumption that
the rendering court and the recognizing court have the same jurisdiction, similar to identical
rules of procedure, and equal judicial "dignity." The nature of the initial tribunal affects the
scope of preclusion. Relitigation may be permitted when there are significant limitations on the
quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed by the two courts. The comparison of pro-
cedures should focus on the practical aspects of the procedures involved and not simply on
matters of form. For example, proof-taking in an administrative or arbitration tribunal may be
relatively informal but may nevertheless permit the parties to present substantially the same
evidence that might be adduced through the more formal procedures characteristic of courts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83, 84 (1980). Employers designing a voluntary
and private dispute resolution system should build in appropriate procedural protections. See
Port Huron Hosp., supra note 187.
193. The Michigan Court of Appeals has indicated that a public policy claim is the kind
of dispute that is subject to arbitration. Ryoti v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 142
Mich. App. 805, 371 N.W.2d 454 (1985). Where there is a collective bargaining agreement
the "just cause" provision and applicable arbitration under the contract may preclude tort
claims. See, e.g., Smith v. Greyhound Lines, 614 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (public policy
claim); Basak v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 122 II1. App. 3d 240, 460 N.E.2d 1197 (1983)
(public policy claim).
194. In a number of cases, courts have held that claims for retaliatory discharge and
other torts are not subject to contractually agreed-upon grievance and arbitration procedures
since those claims arise independent of the contract. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores,
Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (public policy claim); Harper v. General Dynamics Corp.,
117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3197 (D. Cal. 1984); Messenger v. Volkswagen, 585 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.
W. Va. 1984) (public policy claim); Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Nahm, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 207
Cal. Rptr. 117 (1984) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Stocking v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 68 Or. App. 598, 683 P.2d 1021 (1984) (public policy claim).
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that § 301 of the LMRA does not preempt a state
[Vol. 23
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Certainly, procedural fairness and explicit protections against reprisal
would help courts view such arbitration, or mediated decisions, as final and
binding. Guidance may be secured from The Restatement of Judgments,
which sets out a series of requirements necessary for fair adjudication in
administrative arbitration proceedings. These include:
1) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the
adjudication;
2) The right to present evidence and arguments and the fair
opportunity to rebut evidence and argument by the opposing
side;
3) A formulation of issues of law and fact;
4) A rule specifying the point in the proceeding when a fi-
nal decision is rendered; and,
5) Other procedural elements . . . necessary to ensure a
means to determine the matter in question . . determined by
the complexity of the matter . . . the urgency with which the
matter must be resolved and the opportunity of the parties to
obtain evidence and formulate legal contentions.'95
These principles should be useful to employers attempting to create proce-
dural mechanisms to resolve such disputes. Processes used in analogous sit-
uations, such as revocation of physician staff privileges 96 may be helpful
analogies in securing judicial acceptance.
To maximize the possibility that exhaustion would be required on all
issues, employers should obtain a clear, voluntary statement from the em-
ployee that the grievance/arbitration procedure is applicable to all such
claims. In addition, there should be an agreement or consent by the em-
ployee: to submit such claims to arbitration; to exhaust such procedures
prior to litigation; and to have the award judicially enforced. While the
employee thus loses his right to sue, he gains alteration of his previous at-
will status. Employers would include such agreement and procedures in sep-
arate contracts, or in personnel policies or handbooks.
The outlines of such a system of education, mediation and decision
making may well be evolving in the legal profession. Lawyers are unique in
that their professional standards typically have legal effect, either through
legislation or judicial rule. The new ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
law claim of retaliatory discharge if that claim can be decided without interpreting the appli-
cable collective bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
1877 (1988). Since most professionals do not work under collective bargaining agreements,
such preemption issues rarely arise in connection with their discharges.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1980).
196. See, e.g., Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 497 P.2d 564 (Haw. 1972); Storrs v.
Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y, 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
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duct provide that supervising lawyers must make "reasonable efforts," to
ensure that the conduct of all lawyers conforms to the rules of professional
conduct.197 The comments to this rule make clear that this creates an af-
firmative duty, with enforcement varying with the size of the firm. In small
firms, informal supervision is sufficient; in larger settings more elaborate
and formal procedures may be necessary."" In such larger organizations,
educational and dispute resolution mechanisms should be established.
Clearly, law firms may not punish a lawyer who refuses an order that
violates the Model Rules.'99 Moreover, a subordinate is required to report
such unethical directives to disciplinary authorities.200 A duty is created on
lower level subordinate attorneys to follow the Rules, despite contrary de-
mands by a supervisory lawyer.20 Even if he feared that he would lose his
job the subordinate would be liable for the misconduct, although the super-
visory demand could be considered in mitigation.20 2 The supervisor is like-
wise liable to discipline if he induces a violation.20 3 Finally, there may be
financial sanctions against lawyers who fail their ethical obligations. Civil
liability may be incurred if a plaintiff can prove that the absence of institu-
tional safeguards proximately caused injury as a result of unethical con-
duct. Courts often look to code obligations to define professional duties. 04
Courts are also now routinely imposing monetary sanctions on advocates
197. MRPC at Rule 5.1(a).
198. Id. at Rule 5.1. The Comment to this rule states that "The measures required to
fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on the firm's struc-
ture and the nature of its practice."
199. Id. at Rule 5.1(b) ("A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another law-
yer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.").
200. MRPC at Rule 8.3(a) requires that a lawyer report "a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthi-
ness or fitness as a lawyer in other respect." "Substantial" refers to the seriousness of the
possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. Id. at Rule 8.3
Comment.
201. Id. at Rule 5.2(a).
202. See, e.g., In re Mogel, 18 A.D.2d 203, 238 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1963); In re Knight, 129
Vt. 428, 281 A.2d 46 (1971); In re Lemisch, 321 Pa. 110, 184 A. 72 (1936); In re Goldberg,
321 Pa. 109, 184 A. 74 (1936); In re Kiley, 22 A.D.2d 527, 256 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1965). These
cases, however, involved situations in which the associate was involved in clearly wrongful
conduct. Rule 5.2(b) states that a lawyer does not violate the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct if he "acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty." There is, as yet, no specific case authority dealing
with Model Rule 5.2(b).
203. MRPC at Rule 5.1(a).
204. For example, violation of Model Rule 1.3 (due diligence required in representation)
may subject a lawyer to civil liability when the violation proximately causes damage. See, e.g.,
Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979), affid in part, rev'd in part and remanded,
616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
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who act unethically or who violate rules and statutes.05
VII. CONCLUSION
The employment-at-will rule emerged a century ago. The rule was en-
tirely judge-made, and reflected ideas that powerfully influenced the judi-
cial imagination of that time. Those underlying ideas have now been thor-
oughly discredited. No other industrialized society continues to give these
ideas operative force.2"6 Even two American jurisdictions have recently en-
acted statutes which alter the legal status of employees.20 7 The United
States is unique in not providing legal protection against unjust dismissal,
or non-litigation alternatives for resolving employment disputes.
The employment-at-will rule produces unjustifiable results in many in-
stances. For professionals employed full-time by one employer the rule
often creates intolerable conflict between ethical duty and economic pru-
dence. But there is little political pressure on legislatures for transformation
by statute in the vast majority of states. As a judge-made common law
doctrine, employment-at-will is ripe for judge-made change. 20 8 Alterna-
tively, alterations may emerge through the voluntary agreements and
processes of private organizations and individuals. Hopefully these develop-
ments will occur soon.
205. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); Davis v. Veslan Enter-
prises, 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985) (sanctions for improper removal petition); 2A J. MOORE,
J. LUCAS, G. GROTHEER, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.02 [2], [3] (2d ed. 1987).
206. See generally Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
207. Both Montana and the Virgin Islands now effectively limit discharge of non-proba-
tionary employees to a "good cause" standard. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914
(1987); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (1987). These exceptions, however, illustrate the
general state of the law.
208. "I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life." B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
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